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INTRODUCTION 
Since 1975, Armenian terrorists have deliberately murdered some 35 
Turkish diplomats or members of their immediate families, while killing 
an equal number of non-Turks simply because they happened to be in 
their line of fire. In addition, more than 300 others have been wounded.1 
Most Turks, including their government, feel that these Armenian 
terrorists have been receiving aid and sympathy from various groups and 
states around the world. Indeed, there is a tendency to blame anyone 
who might favor a weakened Turkey. In taking this position, the Turks 
have no doubt been influenced by the memories of how Armenian 
aspirations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were often in-
stigated by European imperialist schemes to weaken and eventually 
divide the Ottomon Empire.2 It must be emphasized, therefore, that the 
vast majority of today's transnational Armenian groups and organiza-
tions have nothing to do with terrorism. Nevertheless, some of them at 
times, and a few of them often, pursue their work in such a manner as to 
support terrorism against Turkey implicitly and even overtly. The pur-
pose of this article is to analyze this situation. 
THE TRANSNATIONAL SETTING 
Deported in the distant past by the Byzantine Empire and Iran, 
deported more recently by the Turks during World War I, and subject to 
other, more voluntary migrations, Armenians presently find themselves 
living in a number of different countries. There are, for example, signifi-
cant Armenian communities today in such disparate states as: the Soviet 
Union (4,000,000); the United States (600,000); France (350,000); Iran 
(200,000+); and Lebanon (200,000). In addition, smaller Armenian 
communities exist in Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Brazil, Canada, 
Egypt, Greece, India, Iraq, Romania, Syria, and the United Kingdom, 
among others. 
Since Armenians tend to be a closely knit group who in their own 
language distinguish themselves from odars (non-Armenians), the Arme-
nian disaspora around the world has provided a unique, transnational 
system of contacts and support. Thus, while the actual terrorists are few 
in number, they often are able to draw tacit support from this broader, 
transnational Armenian community. Recently, for example, an Arme-
nian American newspaper published "An Appeal to all Armenians," 
which declared: "Since 1975, underground groups have been formed to 
use effective forceful means to pursue the Armenian cause. Armenians 
have a moral responsibility to support these activities with all available 
means."3 The fact that over $250,000 in small donations was raised in 
the United States to defend Hampig Sassounian,4 who was eventually 
convicted of murdering the Turkish Consul in Los Angeles in 1982, fur-
ther illustrates this substantial aid. 
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Particularly, one should note a number of specific, transnational 
Armenian organizations. Three traditional Armenian political parties still 
have numerous branches throughout the world: the Dashnaks (the Arme-
nian Revolutionary Federation); the Hunchaks; and the Ramgavars. 
Evidence indicates that the Dashnaks, by far the largest of the three with 
affiliates among youth groups, sport clubs, and political activist groups, 
sponsored one of the two main contemporary Armenian terrorist groups, 
the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG).3 
The Armenian church is an even more important transnational 
Armenian organization. Since 301 A.D., when the Armenians became 
the first people in the world to adopt Christianity as their official state 
religion, the church has played probably the key role in the survival of 
the Armenian identity. Today the Armenian apostolic church is divided 
into two rival branches: the Mother See in Etchmiadzin, Soviet Armenia, 
and the Cilician See in Antelias, Lebanon. Each is headed by a 
Catholicos or Pope who presides over a transnational, ecclesiastical 
hierarchy. In recent years, the Cilician See has been under the tight con-
trol of the Dashnaks. One must assume that the Mother See in Soviet 
Armenia has close ties with the Soviet government. In addition, one 
should note the existence of Armenian Patriarchs in Istanbul and 
Jerusalem, each of which has been in existence for hundreds of years and 
owes allegiance to the Mother See. 
Although much smaller in numbers, there also are Armenian Protes-
tant and Roman Catholic churches. Particularly important are the 
Mekhitarists, a Roman Catholic Armenian congregation which establish-
ed the noted island monastery of San Lazzaro in Venice in 1715. On their 
island sanctuary, the Mekhitarists have long operated a printing press, 
possessed a fine library and issued a noted scholarly journal. Another 
Mekhitarist order has operated from Vienna since 1811. 
Further, there are a whole array of Armenian charitable and educa-
tional organizations. Possibly the most famous is the Armenian General 
Benevolent Union (AGBU) which operates in a number of different 
countries. Its current President for life is the noted Armenian American 
philanthropist, Alex Manoogian. The Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation 
is a similar organization. 
Finally, it should be considered that Armenian aspirations against 
Turkey tend to elicit a great deal of public and private support and sym-
pathy around the world from non-Armenians because of the widespread 
belief, referred to above, that the Ottoman Turks ruthlessly massacred 
tens of thousands of Armenians in the latter part of the nineteenth cen-
tury and then undertook their deliberate extermination during World 
War I. Add to these damning accusations that the Islamic Ottoman Em-
pire was one of the leading historical enemies of Christian Europe, while 
the Christian Armenians were usually viewed much more sympathetical-
ly, as well as the fact that Armenians enjoyed a much better facility with 
different languages than the Turks and thus were better able to get their 
views across to the rest of the world, and one can readily appreciate the 
Armenians' special transnational position today. 
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LEBANON AND THE PLO 
As a result of the upheavals of World War I, Lebanon came to serve 
as the host for the largest group of displaced Armenians in the Middle 
East. They soon numbered some 200,000 or approximately 6 percent of 
that country's population.6 After 1934, these Armenians were 
represented in the Lebanese parliament, which was organized along con-
fessional lines. Despite many positive achievements in their adopted 
country, however, the Armenian Lebanese gradually fell into the in-
ternecine power struggles that were to turn Lebanon into a country where 
violence was a way of life. Under these circumstances the Dashnaks 
formed close alliances with the right-wing Christian Phalangists of Pierre 
Gemayel and the National Liberals of Camilla Chamoun. Left-leaning 
Armenians such as the Hunchaks, on the other hand, drew close to 
Kemal Jumblatt's left-wing Progressive Socialist Party and various fac-
tions of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). 
Behind the rampant anarchy in Lebanon, it was not surprising these 
leftist Armenians formed ASALA with the aid of a Palestinian ally 
which already had demonstrated the possibilities of terrorism and with 
which they shared such common attributes as a lost homeland and a scat-
tered population. As ASALA's leader, Hagop Hagopian himself, 
asserted: "Many Armenians since 1966 participated in the Palestinian 
Arab struggle from which they learned many things."7 
The Lebanese roots of contemporary Armenian terrorism were fur-
ther illustrated during the Paris trial of the four ASALA agents who had 
seized the Turkish consulate there on September 24, 1981, killing its 
Turkish guard and wounding the consul himself. Kevork Guzelian, who 
was charged with the murder, was born and raised in Beirut as were two 
of his three accomplices. Hampig Sassounian, the convicted murderer of 
the Turkish Consul in Los Angeles in 1982, hailed from Lebanon. Levon 
Ekmekjian, the ASALA terrorist captured by the Turks during the at-
tack on the Ankara airport in August 1982, which left nine dead and over 
seventy wounded, was a Lebanese national who was recruited by 
ASALA in Lebanon. All of the so-called "Lisbon Five," who died in an 
explosion when they seized the Turkish embassy in Lisbon, Portugal, on 
July 27, 1983, came directly from Bourj Hammoud, the teeming Arme-
nian quarter in Beirut. Both Sonner Nayir and Varoujian Garbidjian, the 
two main ASALA agents accused of the Orly airport bombing in July 
1983, which resulted in seven dead and over sixty wounded, were 
recruited by ASALA in Beirut. As Martin Halabian, the Director of In-
formation for the National Association for Armenian Studies and 
Research in Cambridge, Massachusetts, explained: "Armenians recently 
arrived from Lebanon and other Mideast countries ... are more used to 
militancy as a way of life."* • 
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) — a 
small, radical faction of the PLO led by George Habash — has almost 
certainly provided training and logistical support for ASALA. "An 
observer would notice the similarity in the tactics of the Armenian Secret 
Army and the Popular Front ... with which it has close ties,'" began a 
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1982 interview with ASALA leaders. According to Claire Sterling, 
Habash had been "training his Armenian wards in Lebanon and South 
Yemen for years."10 On April 8, 1980, Habash's PFLP held a press con-
ference for ASALA and a "Kurdistan Worker's Party" at a hideout in 
the ancient Casbah of Sidon, Lebanon. The fourteen hooded ASALA 
representatives, protected by Palestinians, "emphasized their links with 
Marxist Palestinian formations."" 
The ASALA terrorists who seized the Turkish consulate in Paris in 
September 1981 told the police they were trained in Palestinian camps.12 
Evidence exists that "extremist [Palestinian] factions" collaborated with 
ASALA in its bloody attack on the Ankara airport in August 1982.13 
After its forces overran the PLO strongholds in Lebanon during the sum-
mer of 1982, Israel reported that captured PLO documents confirmed 
the ASALA-PLO connection.14 
A detailed Wall Street Journal report stated that ASALA "trained 
with radical left-wing Palestinian groups (the PFLP and PDFLP) and 
sent more than 100 members through Fatah's schools for foreign ter-
rorists in Hamouriah, south of Damascus in Syria."" A high-ranking 
Turkish officer, who had access to the testimony of some 43,000 Turks 
who had been detained after the Turkish military came to power in 
September 1980, told Claire Sterling in early 1982: "The Palestinians 
gave training, aid, ammunition, and arms to leftists, rightists, Kurdish 
separatists, and Armenians."16 
Despite this evidence, ASALA has denied a Palestinian connection, 
claiming that while it "considers the Palestine cause to be its own 
cause," the relationship was one of "comradeship, not organizational.... 
But we have no links whatsoever with the PLO."17 Farouk Kaddorimi, 
the head of the PLO's political bureau, has also denied that his organiza-
tion has supported ASALA." The reader may judge for himself whether 
such denials ring true or not based on the admittedly incomplete evidence 
presented above. 
THE SOVIETS 
The Russians and the Turks have been enemies for centuries. Over 
the past 200 years, no country has benefitted more than Russia from the 
decline of what Tsar Nicholas I once termed "the sick man of Europe." 
Indeed, the Russians waged three successful wars in the nineteenth cen-
tury to gain Turkish territory. In each one, the Russians attempted to use 
the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire as a fifth column with 
varying degrees of success. Even Lord Bryce, the great friend of the 
Armenians, admitted this: "When foreign armies enter [the Ottoman 
Empire] whether it be Bulgaria or Armenia, they are welcomed as 
deliverers by the subject population."19 The famous commander of the 
Russian army which invaded eastern Anatolia in 1877 was a Russian 
Armenian, General Loris-Malikoff. His original surname "Melikian" 
simply had been Russianized. The deportations and massacres of Arme-
nians in World War I took place against the background of Ottoman-
Armenian support for the invading Russian armies. 
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After that struggle, the new Soviet regime eventually established an 
Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic on the Turkish border as one of its 
constituent federal entities. In time this new Soviet Armenia became a 
magnet for Armenian support throughout the world because the Soviet 
authorities allowed the native Armenian genius an amazing amount of 
free expression and development. The result has been "perhaps the most 
thriving, vigorous and open society anywhere in the Communist 
world.... Its economic performance can today compare with that of ad-
vanced industrialized nations of similar size."20 Many Armenians have 
played leading roles in Soviet society, operating as dentists, doctors, 
engineers, generals, and scientists throughout the country. The former 
President of the Soviet Union, Anastas Mikoyan, was probably the best 
known. 
The Soviet authorities also have permitted Armenian national feel-
ings to manifest themselves by allowing Mt. Ararat, a symbol of Arme-
nian nationalism and now located just across the border in Turkey, to be 
represented on the insignia of the Armenian SSR. On the outskirts of 
Erevan, a somber, impressive monument to the Armenian victims of 
1915 testifies to the Soviet support of a cause often forgotten by others. 
In the village of his birth, a small bust of General Antranik, an Armenian 
hero in the struggle against the Turks during and after World War I, now 
stands. Not surprisingly, Armenians around the world tend to have a 
positive and even grateful feeling towards the Soviet Union, and, 
therefore, can be used by that state to whip up support or at least win 
favorable acquiescence for certain types of policies. 
Immediately after World War II, for example, the Soviet Union 
made territorial demands on portions of eastern Turkey which had been 
held by Russia from 1878 until the end of World War I. Since these lands 
were part of Armenian territory, Armenian communities around the 
world threw their support to the Soviet cause.21 Only the beginnings of 
the Cold War and the support given Turkey by the United States under 
the Truman Doctrine probably prevented the enlargement of Soviet 
Armenia at the expense of Turkey. 
Now that Turkey is a member of NATO, that alliance guarantees 
the existing border. Any Soviet attempt to encroach upon it, therefore, 
has to be more subtle. Many Turks feel that in ASALA the Soviets have 
found a "proxy"22 to accomplish just this purpose. "The same territorial 
demands are repeated this time by the Soviet-supported terrorists ... I 
refer to the Armenian terrorists, Asala, who said this openly...."23 Since 
it is an avowedly Marxist group which feels, in its own words, that 
"Soviet Armenia should be to us, what Hanoi was for the Vietnamese 
during their liberation war,"24 ASALA would indeed make a natural 
proxy for Soviet ambitions towards Turkey. Similarly, Paul Henze has 
argued that "to exacerbate Turkey's relations with her [NATO] alliance 
partners" is one of the real aims of ASALA. "We see this happening 
over and over again as each Armenian assassination of a Turkish 
diplomat generates strain in Turkish relations with the country where it 
has occurred."23 As the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 
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Fred Iklé, recently noted concerning ASALA: "If it were to be successful 
in its aims it would lead directly to the expansion of the Soviet Union."" 
Dismantling the southeastern anchor of NATO is not the only 
benefit the Soviets would receive if ASALA's territorial aims were 
satisfied. A truncated Turkey would eliminate it as an attractive model 
for the Turkic and Islamic populations of the Soviet Union which now 
constitute 27 percent of the entire Soviet population. 
In her study of international terrorist connections, Claire Sterling 
devoted an entire chapter to detailing the extent of Soviet attempts to 
destablize Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s.27 The strong possibility of a 
Soviet hand in back of Mehmet Ali Agca's attempt to kill the Pope fur-
ther illustrates how the Soviets might use proxies, such as ASALA, to 
serve their ulterior purposes." Elsewhere, Henze asked: "Are these 
Armenians likely to have developed their deadly professional skill 
without benefit of training by seasoned professionals? Where else, except 
through the KGB, can such training be readily arranged — whether given 
under PLO or other auspices?2' In a letter to the author, Henze further 
argued that the killing of Turkish diplomats by Armenians is "designed 
only to anger and exacerbate — there is no basis ... for any kind of 
reconciliation, concessions or bargaining. The viciousness of that ap-
proach leads me to believe that there has to be Soviet encouragement, if 
not instigation, behind it."30 As for Soviet denials of any role in the kill-
ings, Henze pointed out that "the Soviets have never had any problems 
in making contradictory statements or in covering their covert support 
for various groups by making pious and self-righteous denials. Consider 
for example the Soviet position on the massacre of Polish officers in 
Katyn Forest."31 
After the military government of General Kenan Evren came to 
power in Turkey in September 1980 and cracked down on domestic ter-
rorism, huge amounts of weapons were seized. The general consensus as 
to their origin was the Soviet Union.'2 According to another report: 
"Much evidence is surfacing of the remarkably close tie-up between 
Asala, the Russians and extremist factions of the ... PLO, as well as 
possible links to Syria."33 Based on his extensive experience with Arme-
nian terrorism, the head of the Los Angeles Police Department bomb 
squad, Detective Arleigh McCree, recently declared that investigations 
have "developed a strong Russian connection."34 Commenting about 
the recent work on "the tragic events of World War I" by Professor 
John Giragosian, who is also the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Soviet 
Armenia, The Armenian Reporter asserted: "There is reason to believe 
that these articles are not coincidental to the surge of Armenian terrorism 
directed at Turkish diplomats."31 Indeed, claims have been made that 
the Soviets have been trying to destablize Turkey through the Armenians 
as early as 1928 when the "International Minority Movement Front" in 
Odessa gave financial aid to a combination of Armenians, Kurds, and 
anti-Kemalist Turks.36 Yonah Alexander recently stated that he had seen 
evidence that the Soviets had planted whole families of Armenian 
émigrés in Lebanon as early as the 1930s so that they someday might be 
used against Turkey.37 
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Thus, it is possible to make a strong circumstantial case for Soviet 
support of ASALA. Tangible proof, however, is not possible to achieve. 
What is most likely is that the Soviets simply have been playing their 
usual game of trying to destablize their potential foes, actions not, it 
should be noted, foreign to American behavior as well. ASALA pro-
bably has been just one of many terrorist groups attempting to strike at 
Turkish stability that has received some covert Soviet aid. 
As one of the two superpowers in world politics today, however, the 
Soviet Union often has an inherent interest in not promoting instability. 
Levon Manasserian and Vardan Voskanyan, two Soviet Armenian 
foreign affairs officials, have declared, for example, that Soviet "foreign 
policy must be made in Moscow, not in Armenia. Steps against Turkey, a 
NATO member, would involve our overall relations with NATO, and the 
need to maintain world peace."3' A Russian journalist, who spent time 
in Soviet Armenia before immigrating to the West in 1977, stated that the 
USSR wanted to be "very careful about... nationalist trends in Armenia 
which the Soviets are trying to check."" Certainly, too much Soviet sup-
port for the Armenians might cause ill-will among the Turkic and 
Muslim populations who vastly outnumber the Armenian population in 
the Soviet Union. 
The question of Karabagh specifically illustrates how the Soviets 
have to be careful. Karabagh is an autonomous region contiguous to 
Soviet Armenia but politically attached to the (Turkic) Azerbaijani 
Soviet Republic with which it does not share a common boundary. 
Although some 85 percent of the population of Karabagh is Armenian, 
the region remains part of Azerbaijan. In recent years, the Armenians 
have tried unsuccessfully to have the boundary altered in their favor, but 
no action has been taken, "evidently for fear of arousing the ire of 
Muslim people."40 
That there may be less to the Soviet role in Armenian terrorism than 
some have concluded is possibly verified by ASALA itself. In the Al-
Majallah interview, the ASALA representative declared that Soviet 
Armenia "should be a springboard for liberation, but this is not happen-
ing, apparently because they [the Soviets] believe only in what they call 
'democratic struggle* as far as Turkey is concerned."41 In an earlier in-
terview, Hagop Hagopian replied to the query: "Does the USSR agree 
with your program?" in the negative. "Unfortunately no. To fight 
Turkey, which is a part of the Western bloc, we need the support of the 
socialist countries, but the Soviets consider efforts to liberate Armenia 
from the Turks as being directed against them and last year, to give you 
an example, they hanged three Soviet Armenian patriots."42 
Therefore, the verdict on the Soviet role must be postponed, pro-
bably indefinitely. It seems unlikely that a group deliberately designed by 
a secretive, totalitarian government to be known to only a very small cir-
cle in the KGB and upper Soviet hierarchy, and purposely programmed 




THE UNITED STATES 
Although estimates vary, there are probably some 600,000 people of 
Armenian descent living in the United States today.43 This constitutes a 
figure second only to the well over 4,000,000 Armenians reported by the 
1979 Soviet census as living in the USSR. 
Armenians have achieved prominence in virtually every avenue of 
Armenian life in numbers much higher than their relatively small percen-
tage of the American population.44 The United States hosts, for example, 
an estimated 10,000 physicians, 5,000 attorneys, over 2,000 university 
professors, thousands of engineers and businessmen, and over 100 
millionaires of Armenian descent. In addition, Armenians are present in 
the entertainment industry, sports, politics, the military, and mass 
media. Author William Saroyan, entertainer "Cher," and California 
Governor George Deukmejian are a few, very well-known examples. 
At the present time there are also eighteen Armenian day schools 
functioning in the United States, 28 different periodicals, ten of which 
are in English, and four major resource and research centers dealing with 
Armenians. In California alone there are over 200 separate Armenian 
organizations including churches, political parties, athletic organiza-
tions, cultural associations, social groups, and professional societies 
which are contantly sponsoring activities. One source estimated that 
there were "probably 10 different Armenian activities during any one 
weekend night in Los Angeles."45 The vast majority of these Armenian 
organizations and activities have nothing to do with terrorism. However, 
a number of them occasionally, and a few of them frequently, pursue the 
Armenian cause in a manner which overtly supports hatred of Turkey 
and, at times, even implicitly or explicitly condones violence. 
Harry Derderian, a leading official of the Armenian National Com-
mittee (the Dashnak's political arm), for instance, was quoted as stating, 
"If the terrorism is a contributing factor in getting people's attention, I 
can go along with it."4 ' Commenting about the events of 1915 and the 
current terrorism, Armand Arabian, a superior court judge in Califor-
nia, reportedly declared, "It is the right of Armenians to seek redress.... 
Some seek it on street corners."47 After Hampig Sassounian was found 
guilty of murdering the Turkish Consul in Los Angeles in 1982, some 
Armenians in Boston announced that "What occurred throughout Ham-
pig's trial was a mockery of justice, an attempt to stop the Armenian 
people from actively pursuing their cause."4' Referring to the same case, 
Bishop Yeprem Tabakian, the prelate of the Western Prelacy of the 
Armenian Apostolic Church, stated, "Hampig's conviction is an indict-
ment directed against all Armenians,"49 and Archbishop Vatche Hovsep-
tian, the primate of the Western Diocese of the Armenian Church, add-
ed, "I am truly shocked about the verdict."50 Larry Cretan, the former 
director of the Hollywood-based Armenian Assembly, acknowledged 
that he was "disturbed by those kinds of {terrorist] acts because I feel 
they're counterproductive," but said he could "understand the motiva-
tions behind them."51 
Other Armenians have been more explicit in their comments. Levon 
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Marashlian, a Glendale College professor Armenian history and culture, 
said Armenian terrorists are "patriots who have been waiting for 70 
years...."52 An Armeman student of Dr. Dennis Papazian, a professor 
of history at the University of Michigan in Dearborn, was quoted as say-
ing: "In a way I'm kind of proud of the terrorists."53 Referring to the 
trial of two Armenian terrorists who had murdered the Turkish Am-
bassador to Yugoslavia in March 1983, the Dashnak newspaper in 
Boston, Massachusetts declared: "To consider it a criminal act distorts 
the selfless struggles of the Armeman youth, who are pursuing the just 
cause of their people."54 Speaking at a benefit luncheon for the "LA 5," 
who were arrested in October 1982 for attempting to bomb the Turkish 
consulate in Philadelphia and later convicted, the mother of one of them 
was quoted as saying: "We believe in the same things they believe in. If 
they're criminals, so are we. We raised them."55 
In 1984, there were several resolutions before the U.S. Congress 
dealing with the Armenian cause.56 House Joint Resolution 247 would 
have designated April 24, 1984 as a "National Day of Remembrance of 
Man's Inhumanity to Man." Under its provisions, the people of the 
United States would have been called upon "to observe such a day as a 
day of remembrance for all the victims on the genocide, especially the 
one and one-half million people of Armenian ancestry who were victims 
of the genocide perpetrated in Turkey between 1915 and 1923...." 
House Resolution 171 and Senate Resolution 124 were identical. 
They each would have recognized that "the Armenian genocide was con-
ceived by the Turkish Ottoman Government and implemented from 1915 
to 1923, resulting in the extermination of one and a half million Arme-
nian men, women, and children" and would have made it "the policy of 
the United States" to "embrace these historical events." Finally, Senate 
Joint Resolution 87 resolved: "That April 24, 1984 be designated as a 
day of remembrance for all victims of genocide especially those of Arme-
nian ancestry." 
Although House Resolution 247 apparently achieved enough pro-
mised votes to be passed in the spring of 1984, in the end it and the other 
three failed to be carried due to the intervention of the U.S. State Depart-
ment. The Reagan administration felt that passage of the Resolution 
would "muck up relations with Turkey" and encourage certain Arme-
nians to continue terrorist strikes.5' Nevertheless, on September 28, 
1984, the U.S. House of Representatives reversed itself and unanimously 
passed Resolution 247. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee then 
approved another Resolution (241), "expressing the sense of the Senate 
that the foreign policy of the United States should take account of the 
genocide of the Armeman people." 
Commenting upon these events in an editorial entitled "ASALA's 
Day," the Wall Street Journal concluded: "In a week when Congress is 
examining ways to prevent attacks on our embassies, it is particularly 
ironic to consider resolutions that will be widely interpreted as endorsing 
terrorism against the diplomats of a democratic ally."5' Although the 
Reagan administration managed to block any further action at this time, 
39 
Fall 1985 
Armenian political power in the United States had been demonstrated 
once again. 
The United States Holocaust Memorial Council provides still 
another expression of this political power. The Council was established 
by the U.S. Congress in 1980 as an independent agency to create a 
memorial museum in Washington, D.C., in remembrance of the victims 
of the Jewish Holocaust in World War II. The Holocaust Museum was 
designed to contain approximately 70,000 square feet of floor space 
divided into exhibit areas, a library, seminar rooms, and offices. Located 
opposite the Washington Monument, the museum is scheduled to open 
in 1986. In April 1981, due to heavy Armenian lobbying, the Council 
unanimously resolved that "the Armenian genocide should be included 
in the Holocaust Museum Memorial." The negative connotations of 
such moves for Turkey should be obvious. 
"Genocide studies" represents yet another Armenian attempt to 
present their case to the American public. In recent years a number of 
public school systems in the United States have adopted curricula dealing 
with the horrors of modern genocide. Although the original focus was to 
be on the Jewish genocide of World War II, Armenians in the United 
States have been able to incorporate "the Armenian genocide" into a 
number of these programs. "The result will be ... that this forgotten 
Genocide of the Armenians will be once again remembered,"" conclud-
ed an Armenian sympathizer. Another Armenian observer reported en-
thusiastically about "genocide studies" which included the Armenian 
cause in states such as Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New 
York, and Pennsylvania. Illustrating the hypocritical, political bias of 
the Armenian position in these studies, this particular observer further 
claimed that "the primary handicap to this study is the inclusion of 
Turkish sources."60 
In other words, Turkey should be accused, tried, and convicted 
without the benefit of any defense, formed by historical, Turkish 
sources, all in the supposed cause of scholarly endeavor. "The continued 
propagation of this distortion of history," concluded Sukru Elekdag, the 
Turkish Ambassador to the United States, "breeds vengefulness from 
generation to generation and plays into the hands of Armenian 
terrorists."" Similarly, the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute, in survey-
ing the host of Armenian activities, found that it was this propaganda 
which "gave way to the creation of Armenian terrorism in the years 
following 1973."" 
In pursuing their cause, American Armenians have won over such 
prominent American politicians as Speaker of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, William P. "Tip" O'Neill. On October 6, 1983, the 
Armenian National Committee held a $150-a-plate dinner in the Los 
Angeles area home of attorney Walter Karabian. More than 200 people, 
including a number of elected officials, attended. They heard O'Neill tell 
them "that during the 40 years he has represented Armenians in his 
district near Boston, he has been made aware of the Armenian Genocide 
of 1915 and the Armenian people's longing for ... the time when 
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Armenia would be a free country and they would be able to get back to 
i t ."" More than $30,000 was raised at the reception by the Dashnak-
affiliated organization. Less than two months later, the same group rais-
ed close to $100,000 at a $250-per-person reception for Walter F. Mon-
dale, the Democratic Party's presidential candidate in 1984. The money 
was donated to Mondale who told the gathering about the "Genocide in 
which the Armenian people were literally subjected to mass 
annihilation."64 Numerous other prominent American politicians are 
strongly identified with the Armenian cause. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the courts of the United States 
have recently returned some stiff sentences against convicted Armenian 
terrorists such as Hampig Sassounian. This tough action stands in mark-
ed contrast to France where the recent trial of the four ASALA agents 
who seized the Turkish consulate and killed its guard in September 1981 
"emerged [as] a major victory for the Armenian cause."" With good 
behavior "our boys," as the terrorists were affectionately referred to by 
French Armenians, may be released within a few years. Despite its 
strength, the American political sympathy for the Armenian cause also 
falls far short of the much more blatant support a number of prominent 
French politicians have given it. 
THE FRENCH 
The French sympathy for the Armenian cause is largely based on 
continuing historical affinities dating back almost a thousand years and 
contemporary political realities involving electoral politics." Together 
these two factors have led to a situation where: the President of France, 
along with several of his highest ranking ministers, has uttered blatantly 
pro-Armenian statements; French courts have returned amazingly light 
sentences against Armenian terrorists who openly admitted to murdering 
Turks; Paris served as the backdrop for a showcase "trial" which con-
victed Turkey of "genocide" in April 1984; and, the government itself 
apparently made secret deals with ASALA, probably creating a situation 
which has permitted France to serve as that organization's headquarters 
in Western Europe." 
At present, the Armenian community in France numbers well over 
350,000 and is, by far, the largest in Western Europe. Until the recent 
rise of Armenian terrorism, this French community was apparently well 
on its way to being totally assimilated. Now all this has changed 
dramatically. 
The Armenian National Movement (ANM), which is headed by Ara 
Toranian, has emerged as a dynamic political force, supporting ASALA 
and advocating terrorism as a method for achieving Armenian goals. The 
ANM also publishes a highly inflammatory periodical called Hay Baykar 
(Armenian Struggle). Dozens of French Armenian youths donate their 
time for free to help put it out. 
Although there is no estimate of how many members the ANM has, 
an independent source stated that on April 24, 1983, almost 5000 French 
Armenians carrying a thousand ASALA flags marched under its 
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leadership. In contrast, only 300 people participated in a Dashnak 
demonstration which was staged at the same time. Similarly, the Arme-
nian Apostolic Church in France has also failed to keep up with the 
changes in the French Armenian community and is clearly not the rally-
ing point it traditionally was in France and still is in most other Arme-
nian communities. The death of Archbishop Serovpe Manoukian in 
April 1984, however, may effect an alteration in this situation. 
An important characteristic of the Armenian community in France 
is the warm relations it enjoys with a number of leading French politi-
cians, particularly the socialists who came to power under François Mit-
terrand in 1981. At least three cabinet members in this government are 
also mayors of cities with large concentrations of Armenians. Some 
French commentators openly accused Gaston Déferre, Minister of the 
Interior and mayor of Marseille, of sympathy for the Armenian terrorists 
when he gave the order to arrest Sonner Nayir, the accused perpetrator 
of the Orly bombing, before Nayir could lead the police to his contacts in 
Marseille. An earlier occasion, in April 1982, saw Defferre declare, 
"France will assist you [the Armenians] to triumph in the pursuit of your 
just cause."" 
Other leading governmental figures have also openly sympathized 
with the Armenian cause. In June 1982, Foreign Minister Claude 
Cheysson rejected a Turkish offer proposing coordinated anti-terrorist 
campaigns between the two countries. Minister of Defense Hernu, who 
resigned in September 1985 over the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior by 
the French Secret Service, told a large Armenian rally in his home city of 
Villeurbane on October 10, 1982: "Whenever there are aggressions, we 
must raise the question as to who the real aggressor is. Are the aggressors 
the people that survived a genocide committed by the Turks or the Turks 
themselves?"" The President of France himself, François Mitterrand, 
appeared on January 7, 1984, at an Armenian Christmas celebration in a 
suburb of Lyon. There he told the gathering: "It is not possible to erase 
the genocide which has struck you. This genocide must be inscribed in 
the memories of everyone, and the tragic fate of the Armenian people 
must serve as a lesson for the youth."70 
The encouragement such statements from French officials give to 
Armenian terrorists and their sympathizers in France is obvious. As one 
Armenian observer concluded: "Such support for the Armenians is seen 
nowhere else in the world."71 "We condemn you ... the past President of 
France, Giscard d'Estaing. If you hadn't tolerated the actions of them 
[the Armenian terrorists and their sympathizers] in return for their votes, 
those murderers would not have lost their self-control, and acted like this 
today,"72 wrote Artin Penik, a Turkish citizen of Armenian descent, 
who committed suicide by setting himself on fire to protest against 
ASALA. 
Three weeks after President Mitterrand's remarks cited above, the 
trial of four ASALA agents began. In 1981 they had seized the Turkish 
Consulate in Paris, murdered its guard, seriously wounded the Consul 
himself, and held 56 people hostage for sixteen hours under the threat of 
death. As partially described above, the entire affair became largely a 
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platform for the Armenians to denounce the Turkish "genocide" and to 
claim a "victory for the Armenian cause." The President of the Court 
ruled that the defendants could not be referred to as "terrorists," the 
defendants were allowed to make long speeches denouncing Turkey, ir-
relevant anti-Turkish letters from singer Charles Aznavour and the 
movie director Henri Verneuil were admitted as evidence, and the defen-
dants finally were given such light sentences that good behavior might 
lead to their early release. The entire affair contrasted strongly with the 
trials of Armenian terrorists being held at the same time in the United 
States and Yugoslavia where maximum sentences were returned. It is no 
wonder the Turkish government and people feel bitterly toward France." 
Less than three months later, the "Permanent Tribunal of Peoples" 
opened in Paris.74 Organized by the French Armenian academician, 
Gerard Chaliand, this "tribunal" heard statements from a number of 
prominent Armenian scholars. It then pronounced Turkey guilty of 
genocide and condemned the international community for its indif-
ference. Although some attempts at independence and objectivity were 
obviously made — three Nobel Prize recipients were part of the jury — 
its decision was a foregone conclusion. Objectivity might have been bet-
ter served had this tribunal been combined with the "International Sym-
posium on Terrorism," being held concurrently in Ankara, Turkey. To 
this latter session, a number of foreign and Turkish scholars supportive 
of the Turkish position were invited." 
Reports that the present French government struck a deal with 
ASALA in 1981" further reveal the French position concerning Arme-
nian terrorism. Prime Minister Mauroy reportedly agreed with ASALA 
that in return for French recognition of "the 1915 genocide," there 
would be no further terrorist attacks on French soil. Further terrorist 
demands, which, to some extent, were apparently met, included leniency 
for Armenian terrorists held in French prisons, unrestricted use of 
French airports by ASALA members, and even permission to store arms 
and equipment on French soil. 
That there was some truth to this alleged deal is indicated by the fact 
that Hagop Hagopian was not arrested, but merely followed and 
photographed when he was in Paris as recently as April 1983. The ease 
with which the French police rounded up so many Armenian terrorists 
immediately after the Orly bombing is also revealing. Indeed, it is 
arguable that if the French authorities had taken a stronger stance 
against terrorist activities the Orly bombing might well have been 
prevented. Its perpetration, however, demonstrated the bankruptcy of 
the French policy. As the Turkish Foreign Minister, liter Turkmen, 
pointedly observed, "Those who support or tolerate terrorism should 
now realize ... terrorist acts can also cause serious damage for 
themselves."77 
CYPRUS 
Sporadic intercommunal violence between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots, punctuated by much heavier outbursts in 1964,1967, and again 
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in 1974, led in 1974 to a Turkish invasion of the island and the establish-
ment of a de facto Turkish Cypriot state in the north to balance the con-
tinuing de jure Greek Cypriot state in the south. 
Many Turks feel that the Greek Cypriots support the Armenian ter-
rorists in revenge for this Turkish invasion." The largely circumstantial 
argument has been offered by a respected leftist univesity professor and 
columnist, Mumtaz Soysal. "Why has this [Armenian] violence been 
revived suddenly after a pause of half a century!?]... The re-starting date 
of this organized violence coincides with the date of the 1974 Turkish 
landing in Cyprus.... To be more specific, the Armenian cause has been 
included in the 'long-term struggle policy'«fth^Greek Cypriots, to 'save 
Cyprus'."" 
Turkish officials have compiled a large file concerning this alleged 
Greek Cypriot connection. Leaflets and press clippings with statements 
made by Armenians and Greek Cypriots supposedly verify the accusa-
tion. Archbishop Makarios, for example, promised the Armenian 
Patriarch Koren in August 1977 that "we will give every material and 
moral support to the Armenians in a bid to internationalise the Arme-
nian question." The new Greek Cypriot President Spyros Kyrianou "has 
been the recipient of the biggest Armenian award by the hand of Koren 
for his 'services to the Armenian cause'." Kyprianou also received an 
award from the Armenian National Council in New York "for the con-
tinued support of the Armenian cause."'0 
More to the point, the Turks have charged that "the Armenian In-
stitute, founded by the Melkonian Brothers in Nicosia under the name 
'Melkonian Institute,' is training elements for the Armenian terrorist 
organisation." More general claims are made that "there is concrete 
evidence in the hands of the Turkish Cypriot administration that sup-
porters of the 'Armenian cause' and the members of the Armenian 
organisation" are being sheltered in the Greek Cypriot sector." "Arme-
nian terrorists are known to have already gathered in the Greek part of 
Cyprus where they have been engaged in certain activities for some 
time,"*2 added another Turkish report. Rauf Dentas, Turkish Cypriot 
leader, brought up the subject of Armenian terrorist camps when he met 
with the commander of the UN peacekeeping force on Cyprus." Hiir-
riyet, the largest selling daily in Turkey, even gave a detailed report on 
what it claimed was a camp near Nicosia of "Armenian murder gangs" 
training and planning sabotage.'4 
The Turkish belief in the reputed connection was given new possible 
substance when PLO evacuees from Beirut passed through Cyprus in 
August 1982. At that time Turkish newspapers claimed that between 250 
and 1,200 Armenian guerrillas had surreptitiously entered Cyprus along 
with the PLO allies evacuating Beirut." 
In the summer of 1983, further reports again indicated that after the 
fall of Beirut some Armenian terrorists escaped to Cyprus," as well as 
several other locations. A detailed report in the Turkish press told how 
on "July 24, [1983] the Greek Cypriot administration gave permission to 
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Armenian terrorists to establish a 'training camp' at the 'Cacopetria' 
region of the Troodos mountains."*7 An accompanying map even pin-
pointed the location in the center of Cyprus. It was claimed that approx-
imately 160-170 Armenian terrorists were being trained at the camp and 
that two more such camps were also operating. Greek officers from 
"motherland Greece" supposedly were training the terrorists at all three 
locations. 
Such reports are, nonetheless, suspect. Although there undoubtedly 
is sympathy among Greek Cypriots for the Armenian terrorists and a 
small Armenian community has long existed in Cyprus, the Greek 
Cypriot government has denied it supports the terrorists and independent 
investigations in Cyprus have yielded no evidence to substantiate claims 
of assistance." Indeed, Greek Cypriot support for the Armenian ter-
rorists probably would be insanely suicidal give the present political, 
geographical, and military facts of life. It is doubtful, therefore, that the 
Greek Cypriots have knowingly given substantial material aid to any 
Armenian terrorists. 
OTHERS 
There are a number of other states which have demonstrated a cer-
tain amount of support for the Armenian cause, probably as an indirect 
way to pressure their historical enemy, Turkey. Chief among them ap-
pear to be Greece, Syria, and Iran. Indeed, for Greece this hostility is 
also very current given the disputes with Turkey over the Aegean Sea and 
Cyprus. 
A small, but active Armenian community exists in Greece. It often 
has manifested overt sympathies for terrorist acts against Turkey and has 
been active in raising funds to defend JCAG terrorists such as Harutiun 
Levonian and Raffi Elbekian, who assassinated the Turkish Ambassador 
to Yugoslavia in March 1983. Papandreou's socialist (PASOK) govern-
ment has relaxed the entry procedures and security checks for those seek-
ing to enter Greece. In addition, the country possesses excellent air con-
nections to Europe, the Middle East, and the Soviet bloc. All of this ob-
viously would facilitate terrorist activities and it seems likely that 
elements of both ASALA and JCAG fled to Greece, as well as to Syria or 
Iran, after the fall of Beirut in 1982." Recently, Panos Kondogiorgia, a 
representative of PASOK, told a gathering of Greek Armenians that in 
their struggle, "waged on all fronts by every method, PASOK is on your 
side."90 Occasionally, however, PASOK did not fulfil that promise. 
Joseph Kasesyan, an ASALA spokesman in Athens, noted his organiza-
tion had participated in a youth festival organized by PASOK in 1981 but 
was refused entry in 1982." 
MIDDLE EAST 
More substantial evidence exists regarding a Syrian-Armenian con-
nection. A number of sources have indicated that some of ASALA's 
leaders fled to Syria after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982." Cer-
tainly the Turkish government of General Kenan Evren was convinced of 
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such "possible links to Syria ... [and] the remarkably close tie-up bet-
ween Asala, the Russians, and extremist factions of the ... PLO.'"2 On 
the very day of the bloody Ankara airport attack in August 1982, a 
Syrian diplomatic courier was detained at the Istanbul airport. His 
diplomatic pouch contained an assortment of weapons and explosives 
destined for the Syrian consulate in that city. Since the two ASALA 
agents who attacked the Ankara airport had travelled in Syria or possess-
ed Syrian passports, the Turks speculated that there was a link.94 Ter-
cuman, a Turkish daily, recently printed the names, addresses, and 
photographs of high-ranking ASALA leaders. All were living in Syria or 
Syrian-controlled parts of Lebanon. This information was supposedly 
verified by experts.93 
In the summer of 1983, it was reported that Syria had "apparently 
succeeded in coopting the pro-Soviet middle eastern section [Hagopian's 
grouping] of... ASALA .... Syria now cooperates with ASALA in train-
ing, the planning of operations and the supplying of arms and forged 
documents." Specific training sites for the terrorists on Syrian soil in-
cluded Kamishli on the Turkish border, a location near the ancient city 
of Homs and Camp Tadmur As-Sahra near Damascus. In Syrian-
controlled Lebanon, ASALA bases were located in the Bekaa Valley 
village of Anjar and in the northern city of Tripoli. In this latter site, 
ASALA operated under the pink-uniformed militia "al Fursan-al Arab" 
(the Arab Horsemen), the organization established by Rifaat al-Assad, 
the brother of Syria's president. Further, the report declared, "The en7 
tire ASALA setup in Syria falls under the patronage of the elite Defence 
Brigades commanded by Rifaat al-Assad."96 The younger Assad is 
believed, in some circles, to do his brother's 'dirty work' and has been 
mentioned as a possible successor to the Syrian leadership. 
In March 1983, the Turkish foreign minister conferred with Presi-
dent Assad in Damascus, but apparently failed to convince him to end 
his support for ASALA. In fact, after the Kurdish Workers Party, a 
reputed ally of ASALA, fled from Turkey, it was granted refuge in 
Syria. In June 1983 and again in October 1984, Turkish military forces 
entered northern Iraq with Iraqi permission, routing Kurdish and Arme-
nian units which had been raiding across the border into eastern Turkey. 
With the Iraqi base thus threatened, Syria may become an even more im-
portant haven for Turkish enemies in the future. 
Over the past several years a number of Armenian terrorist attacks 
against Turks have occurred in Iran. Several more during the spring of 
1984 culminated in the murder of the Turkish Embassy's Military At-
tache and of a Turkish businessman. At least in this way Iran too has 
provided a base for the Armenian terrorists. However, historically, the 
Armenians and the Iranians are enemies, warring against each other 
some 1500 years before the Turks entered Anatolia and it is not clear to 
what extent the present government of Iran condones Armenian actions. 
Ancient Armenia constituted a satrapy in the Persian Empire of 
Darius the Great. In 484 A.D., one of the frequent unequal wars between 
the two was concluded by the Treaty of Nuvarsag. To the Armenians, 
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this event still symbolizes national and religious freedom against tremen-
dous odds. Most Armenians throughout the world celebrated its 1500th 
anniversary in 1984. Past Iranian conquests of former Armenian lands 
and forced migrations of Armenians to Iran, as well as more voluntary 
movements, have led to a situation in which Iran today hosts what may 
be the largest concentration of Armenians in the Middle East, ranging 
from 200,000 to, perhaps, 500,000 people. Recently, Armenian sources 
have begun to complain about Iranian persecution.'7 
The Ottoman and Persian Empires were also historic enemies. In the 
late nineteenth century, "Persia ... became the launching ground for 
[Armenian] operations in nearby Turkish Armenia."" Thus, no 
dramatic reorientation of policy was necessary for either Turkey or Iran 
to view the other in a hostile light. Even before the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in 1982, Iranian authorities apparently had encouraged 
ASALA to relocate in their country, giving them "bases and barracks on 
the Turkish borders and [providing them] with instructors in the use of 
various weapons." The Israeli invasion caused additional elements of 
ASALA to move to Iran. In July and August 1983, ASALA issued its 
first communiqués from Tehran. 
Recently, however, Turkey and Iran apparently have shown a 
greater willingness to control the situation. In April 1984, ignoring death 
threats from ASALA, the Turkish Prime Minister successfully visited 
Tehran. Yet, by the fall of 1984, Turkish businessmen again were com-
plaining that Iranian security officials were paying little attention to their 
appeals for protection from Armenian terrorists.100 
There is some evidence that Iran recently supported ASALA 
assaults on France because France supports Iraq in its war against Iran 
and also provides a refuge for Iranian foes of Khomeini. One Armenian 
leader who met an Iranian foe of Khomeini in Paris was quoted as 
declaring: "Khomeini may be a Judas to you, but he is the spirit of 
holiness to us, for he gives us money and arms."101 In fundamentalist 
Iran, politics is apparently making for strange bedfellows. The am-
biguous situation of the Armenians is only one example. 
CONCLUSION 
Armenian terrorism, similar to Irish terrorism, has international 
connections wherever an Armenian population resides. Historical events 
serve both as a stimulus to overt terrorism by a few members of the 
Armenian community and to sympathy with the causes advocated, by a 
larger number. As a result, the quarrel between Armenia and Turkey cur-
rently has global ramifications and policies set by one country regarding 




1. For analyses, see two other articles by the author, "Contemporary Aspects of Arme-
nian Terrorism," in International Terrorism and the Drug Connection (Ankara: 
Ankara University Press, 1984), pp. 103-144; and "The Armenian Terrorist Campaign 
Against Turkey," Orbis, 27 (Summer 1983), pp. 447-477. 
The declared rationale for this terrorism is to gain revenge for Turkish massacres 
of Armenians during World War I and to achieve what a number of Armenian publica-
tions have summed up as the "3 R's": (1) recognition of what happened; (2) repara-
tions; and (3) restoration of the ancestral homeland. 
The number of Armenians killed and the circumstances involved therein, 
however, are disputed. The Armenians claim that what occurred was genocide wilfully 
perpetrated by the Turkish government. The Turks, on the other hand, claim that a far 
smaller number of Armenians died as an unfortunate result of general wartime condi-
tions, and that, in addition, hundreds of thousands of Turks also were killed at that 
time. 
Out of a plethora of pro-Armenian sources, two in particular are most frequently 
cited to back the Armenian claim: (1) the massive compilation by the senior British 
statesman, Lord James Bryce, and the then young, but later world-renowned historian, 
Arnold J. Toynbee, The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915-16, 
Great Britain, Parlimantary Papers Miscellaneous no. 31 (London: Joseph Cavston, 
1916); and, (2) the memoirs of the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey at that time, Henry 
Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau's Story (Garden City and New York: Double-
day, Page, 1919). In addition, see, Gerard Chaliand and Yves Ternon, The Armenians: 
From Genocide to Resistance (London: Zed Press, 1983). 
For a recent presentation of the Turkish position, see, Documents on Ottoman-
Armenians, Vols. I and II (Ankara: Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and 
Information, 1982 and 1983). Further, see, Kamuran Gurun, Ermeni Dosyasi [The 
Armenian Files] (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1984). 
2. For the Turkish position here, see, Bilal N. Simsir, ed., British Documents on Ottoman 
Armenians, Vols. I and II (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1982 and 1983). 
For the Armenian position, see, Richard G. Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to In-
dependence, 1918 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 
and Louise Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development 
of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1963). 
3. Cited in The Armenian Weekly, July 2, 1983, p. 2. The Armenian Weekly, published in 
Boston, Massachusetts, is an official organ of the Dashnaks (see below). 
4. The reports in The California [Armenian] Courier, September 22, 1983, p. 2; and, 
ibid., December 8, 1983, p. 9. For numerous other egregious examples of such tacit 
support of terrorism, see the articles in ibid., September 13, 1983, p. 3; October 13, 
1983, pp. 8, 12; October 20, 1983, p. 3; December 1, 1983, p. 11; January 12, 1984, p. 
8; March 8, 1984, p. 9; and, August 23, 1984, p. 8; The Armenian Weekly, September 
3, 1983, p. 6; October 21, 1983, p. 1; November 26, 1983; p. 2; December 24, 1983, p. 
1; February 11, 1984, pp. 6-7; June 9, 1984, pp. 2, 15; August 11, 1984, p. 2; and, 
August 18, 1984, p. 8; The Armenian Reporter, June 2, 1983, p. 10; June 23, 1983, p. 
10; August 4, 1983, p. 2; September 1, 1983, p. 3; September 15, 1983, p. 11; April 12, 
1984, p. 3; July 5, 1984, p. 1; and, below. (The Armenian Reporter is an independent 
Armenian American weekly.) 
5. "Contemporary Aspects of Armenian Terrorism," pp. 121 ff.; and the following 
issues of The Armenian Reporter, August 18, 1983, p. 10; September 29, 1983, p. 1; 
November 10, 1983, pp. 1, 8; November 24, 1983, p. 12; December 22, 1983, p. 4; 
January 5, 1984, p. 1; and, September 13, 1984, p. 1. 
The Dashnaks recently changed the name of their terrorist organization to the 
Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA). Numerous issues of the Dashnak organ, The 
Armenian Weekly, contain eulogies and panegyrics to JCAG (now ARA) members. 
For example, see, the issues of August 20, 1983, p. 1; September 17, 1983, p. 3; 
December 10, 1983, p. 1; December 24, 1983, p. 1; January 14, 1984, p. 1; January 21, 
1984, pp. 2, 4; January 28, 1984, p. 1; July 28, 1984, p. 8; August 18, 1984, pp. 2, 3; 
48 
Conflict Quarterly 
and, September 29, 1984, p. IS. The Dashnak weekly virtually ignores the other main 
Armenian terrorist group, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia 
(ASALA). In contrast to the more nationalist and right-wing Dashnaks, ASALA has 
strong Marxist sympathies. 
6. The following discussion is based on Christopher Walker, Armenia: The Survival of a 
Nation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), pp. 363 ff.; Andrew Corsun, "Armenian 
Terrorism: A Profile," U.S. Department of State Bulletin (August 1982), pp. 32 ff.; 
Sato Papazin, "Sept années de lutte armée," Hay Baykar [Armenian Struggle] (Paris: 
Mouvement National Armenian Pour L'ASALA), December 22, 1982, pp. 8-9; and, 
Pierre Terzian, "La Question Arménienne Aujourd'hui," in the special issue of Criti-
que Socialiste, 55, No. 4 (1982), entitled "Arménie du Genocide à L'explosion," pp. 
51-58 and 62-65. 
7. "Armenian Terrorist Leader Hagopian Interviewed: Milan Panorama in Italian, 1 
Sept. 1980, pp. 62-65," in Joint Publications Research Service: Western Europe, No. 
1628, September 24, 1980, hereafter cited as "Panorama Interview." 
8. Cited in Christian Science Monitor, May 6, 1982, p. 5. 
9. "Nadim Nasir Report: Al-Majallah Visits an Armenian Secret Army Base in 
Lebanon," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report (Middle 
East and Africa), September 1,1982, p. G8, hereafter cited as "Al Majallah Interviews 
ASALA." 
10. Claire Sterling, The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981), p. 244. 
11. Ibid., p. 243. 
12. The Economist, October 3, 1981, p. 51. Also see the lengthy report in The Armenian 
Reporter, February 9, 1984, p. 2. 
13. "Behind the Armenian Terrorists," Foreign Report (England) August 19, 1982, p. 1. 
14. See Z. Michael Szaz, "Armenian Terrorist Ironies," Washington Times, September 2, 
1982, p. 8A. Also see New York Times, August 1, 1983, p. A6. 
15. James Ring Adams, "Lessons and Links of Anti-Turk Terrorism," Wall Street Jour-
nal, August 16, 1983, p. 32. 
16. Claire Sterling, The Time of the Assassins: Anatomy of an Investigation (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1983), p. 73. 
17. "Al-Majallah Interviews ASALA." 
18. New York Times, April 17, 1983, p. 8. 
19. James Bryce, Transcaucasia and Ararat (London: Macmillan and Co..Ltd., 1896), p. 
425. 
20. Walker, Survival of a Nation, p. 371. See also, in general, Mary Matossian, The Im-
pact of Soviet Policies in Armenia (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1962). One might also note the 
"Committee for Cultural Relations with Armenians Abroad" has been "developing a 
closer link between the Armenian motherland and the Armenians dispersed to the four 
corners of the world. Formed in 1964, the Committee has won the confidence of 
Diaspora Armenians...." See "20th Anniv. of Spiruk Committee Marked," The 
Armenian Reporter, November 15, 1984, p. 3. 
21. For details, see Walker, Survival of a Nation, pp. 360 ff. 
22. See the statement of Professor Aydin Yalcin in "Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate on 
Turkish Experience with Terrorism" (Serial No. J-97-43), 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 1981, 
p. 5; hereafter cited as "US Senate Hearings on Turkish Terrorism." 
23. Ibid. 
24. "Al-Majallah Interviews ASALA." 
25. Paul Henze, "Coping with Terrorism: What Do We Know? What Can Be Done?" 
(discussion paper presented at the "Conference of the Political and Social Studies 
Foundation" held at Istanbul, Turkey, October 3-6, 1982), p. 16. 
26. "Testimony by the Honorable Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 
Before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee," (Washington: mimeographed, March 11, 1982), p. 6. 
49 
Fall 1985 
27. Sterling, Terror Network, pp. 228-246. 
28. On the Soviet connection in the plot to kill the Pope, see Claire Sterling, The Time of 
the Assassins: Anatomy of an Investigation (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
1983); and Paul Henze, The Plot to Kill the Pope (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1983). 
29. Henze, "Coping with Terrorism," pp. 16-17. 
30. Paul Henze, letter to the author dated March 14, 1983. 
31. Ibid. For analysis of Katyn Forest, see Z.K. Zawodny, Death in the Forest: The Story 
of the Katyn Forest Massacre (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962). 
32. "US Senate Hearings on Turkish Terrorism." On this point, see especially, Turkish 
General Staff, Anarchy and Terror in Turkey; as well as Paul Henze, Goal: Destabliza-
tion — Soviet Agitational Propaganda, Instability and Terrorism in NA TO South 
(European American Institute for Security Research Reprint Series, 1981), pp. 43-44; 
and "The Long Effort to Destabilize Turkey, Atlantic Community Quarterly, 19 
(1981/1982), pp. 472-473. 
33. "Behind the Armenian Terrorists," p. 1. 
34. Cited in Wall Street Journal, August 9, 1983, p. 32. 
35. The Armenian Reporter, March 1, 1984, p. 2. 
36. Gwynne Dyer, "Correspondence," Middle Eastern Studies, 9 (1973), p. 382. 
37. Yonah Alexander, comments made during news conference concerning his new book 
to be published with Ray S. Cline, Terrorism: The Soviet Connection (New York: 
Crane Rusak, 1984), Washington, D.C., January 23, 1984. 
38. Cited in Christian Science Monitor, December 28, 1982, p. 13. 
39. Cited in New York Times, August 1, 1983, p. A6. 
40. Ronald Grigor Suny, Armenia in the Twentieth Century (Chico, California: Scholars 
Press, 1983), p. 81. 
41. "Al-Majallah Interviews ASALA." 
42. "Panorama Interview." 
43. The 1980 U.S. census reported only 212,621 Americans of Armenian heritage. The 
figure is so low because the census probably counted many Armenians as Lebanese, 
Iranians, Syrians, etc. There are probably some 200,000 Armenians in the Los Angeles 
area alone and perhaps as many as 400,000 in Calif orna, which, since 1982, has had a 
governor of Armenian descent, George Deukmejian. The number of Armenians 
should not be exaggerated, however, because at the most they constitute no more than 
1.5 percent of the population of California and barely .2 percent of the overall popula-
tion of the United States. Nevertheless, the point is there are many more Americans of 
Armenian descent than Turkish. 
44. The following discussion is based on Vane Oshagan, "The Armenian-American Con-
tribution," The Armenian Weekly, January 21,1984, p. 3; as well as various issues of 
The [Armenian] California Courier. Also see the lengthy account about Armenians in 
the Los Angeles area by Michael Leahy in the August 1983 issue of the Los Angeles 
magazine, reprinted in four separate parts by The [Armenian] California Courier 
beginning with the issue of August 25, 1983. 
45. The [Armenian] California Courier, December 1, 1983, p. 4. 
46. Cited in Russell Warren Howe, "Unraveling the Motivations for Armenian Terror," 
Washington Times, August 3, 1983, p. 7A. 
47. Cited in Michael Leahy, "LA Armenian Community Grows Fastest in State," The 
California [Armenian] Courier, August 25, 1983, p. 7. 
48. Cited in The Armenian Weekly, January 14, 1984, p. 7. 
49. Cited in The California [Armenian] Courier, January 12, 1984, p. 2. 
50. Ibid. 
51. Ibid., August 4, 1983, p. 2. 
52. Ibid. 
53. Cited in The Armenian Reporter, September 8, 1983, p. 8. 
50 
Conflict Quarterly 
54. The Armenian Weekly, January 14, 1984, p. 1. 
55. Cited in "LA Five Draw Zealous Support from Community," The California [Arme-
nian] Courier, November 10, 1983, p. 2. 
56. For text of resolutions, see United States. Library of Congress. Digest of public general 
bills and resolutions, prepared by the Congressional Research Service. 
57. The Armenian Weekly, June 2, 1984, p. 1. 
58. "ASALA's Day," Wallstreet Journal, October 2, 1984, p. 30. 
59. "NAASR Marks 25th Anniversary," The Armenian Mirror-Spectator, April 7, 1979. 
60. Gary A. Kulhanjian, "Genocide Studies: A Benefit to All," The Armenian Weekly, 
January 7, 1984, p. 2. 
61. "Elekdag Eulogizes Arikah; Condemns Terrorism," Turkey Today (published by the 
Turkish Embassy in the U.S.), February 1982, p. 3. 
62. The Armenian Issue in Nine Questions and Answers (Ankara:^Foreign Policy Institute, 
1982), foreward. 
63. "O'Neill Guest at ANC Reception: Reaffirms Support for Armenian Cause," The 
Armenian Weekly, October 15, 1983, p. 1. 
64. "Mondale Backs Armenian Cause: $100,000 Raised," The [Armenian] California 
Courier, December 15, 1983, p. 1. 
65. The Armenian Reporter, February 16, 1984, p. 11. 
66. For background on the historical relationship between France and Armenia, see David 
M. Lang, The Armenians: A People in Exile (London: George Allen &Unwin, 1981), 
pp. 27, 37, and 59-69; Nalbandian, Armenian Revolutionary Movement, pp. 37-38,71, 
and 96; and Edward Boghosian, "The Armenian Community of France — A Potential 
Force," The Armenian Reporter, February 23, 1984, pp. 1-2. 
67. See "Background, Activities of Armenian Organizations Explored: Cairo -4/-
Musawwar in Arabic, 12 August 1983, pp. 20-21," in Joint Publications Research Ser-
vice: Armenian Affairs, No. 2838, October 17, 1983, p. 10. A purported picture of 
Hagop Hagopian, incidentally, appears in ibid., p. 11. 
68. Cited in The Armenian Reporter, July 28, 1983, p. 7. 
69. Ibid. 
70. The Armenian Weekly, January 21, 1984, p. 1. 
71. Boghosian, "Armenian Community of France," p. 2. 
72. Cited in NewSpot: Turkish Digest, Supplement to issue of August 13, 1982, p. 1. 
73. See, for example, "Armeman Terrorism and the Paris Trial: Views and Evaluation of 
Ankara University," 1984; and, Turkish Daily News, February 3-9, 1984, p. 1. 
74. See the lengthy analyses of its proceedings in The Armenian Reporter, April 19, 1984, 
p. 1; and, ibid., April 26, 1984, pp. 1, 14. 
75. The disinterested scholar who seeks the truth in this ancient Armenian-Turkish feud 
would do well to start his research by studying the proceedings of both these two 
gatherings. 
76. William Echikson, "Armenian Bombing at Orly Ends Pact Between Socialists and Ter-
rorists," Christian Science Monitor, July 19, 1983, p. 4; The Armenian Weekly, July 
23, 1983, p. 1; and, The Armenian Reporter, November 15, 1984, p. 12. 
77. Cited in New York Times, July 16, 1983, p. 1. 
78. Marvine Howe, "Turks Blame Cypriots for Attacks in Name of Armenians," in ibid., 
February 28, 1980, p. 3; in addition see, ibid., March 1, 1980, p. 4; ibid., March 13, 
1980, p. 2; and, "The 'Armenian Connection' in Bombings," The Guardian, 
December 19, 1979, p. 2. 
79. Mumtaz Soy sal, "The Trigger and the Finger," (translated and reprinted from the 
Turkish daily, Milliyet),Turkish News, April 1980, pp. 20-21. 
80. Ibid., p. 21. 
81. Ibid. 
82. NewSpot: Turkish Digest, September 3, 1982, p. 2. 
83. "Dentas Asks about the Armenian Plots," in ibid., September 10, 1982, p. 6. 
51 
Fall 1985 
84. See the accounts in New York Times, February 28, 1980, p. 3; and, David Bar chard, 
"Greek-Armenian," Special News Bulletin, August 23, 1980, p. 2. 
85. See the press accounts in New York Times, August 29, 1982, p. E2; and, NewSpot: 
Turkish Digest, September 10, 1982, p. 2. 
86. "Syria, Greece Reportedly Support Armenian Terrorist Groups: Tehran Alik in 
Armenian, 27 August 1983, pp. 2, 7: in Joint Publications Research Service: Arme-
nian Affairs fJPRS: AR), No. 2839, October 20, 1983, p. 3; "Report on Armenian 
Conference in Lausanne: London Al-Dustur in Arabic, August 8, 1983, p. 35," in 
ibid., No. 2831, October 3, 1983, p. 3; and, The Armenian Reporter, September 15, 
1983, p. 13. 
More recently, see, The Armenian Reporter, October 4, 1984, p. 1; and, ibid., 
November 15, 1984, p. 12. 
87. Yusuf Kanli, "Armenian Terrorists Reported Training in Troodos Mountains," 
Turkish Daily News, September 12-18, 1983, p. 15; and, ibid., October 3-9, 1983, p. 
3. 
88. Cyprus Bulletin (issued by the Press and Information Office, Cyprus), April 2,1983, 
p. 4; New York Times, February 28, 1980, p. 3; and, ibid., March 1, 1980, p. 4. 
89. Robert Kaplan, "Armenian Terrorists Find New Bases from Which to Wage Their 
Battle for a Homeland," Christian Science Monitor, July 14,1983, p. 12; The Arme-
nian Reporter, March 1, 1984, p. 1; and, JPRS: AR, No. 2839. 
90. Cited in JPRS: AR, No. 2839. 
91. Turkish Daily News, January 20-26, 1984, p. 1. 
92. In addition to the sources cited above, see, The Armenian Reporter, September 15, 
1983, p. 13; ibid., December 29, 1983, p. 2; ibid., October 4, 1984, p. 1; and, The 
Armenian Weekly, July 30, 1983, p. 8. 
93. "Behind the Armenian Terrorists," p. 1. 
94. "Briefing" (Ankara), March 28, 1983, p. 8. 
95. See JPRS: AR, No. 2839. 
96. See "The Terrorists," Wall Street Journal, September 19, 1983, p. 32. 
97. See, for example, the reports in The Armenian Reporter, January 5,1984, p. 1; ibid., 
May 31, 1984, p. 1; ibid., September 27, 1984, p. 1; and The California [Armenian] 
Courier, October 6, 1983, p. 8. 
98. Nalbandian, Armenian Revolutionary Movement, p. 173. 
99. This and the following are based on "Armenian Groups Reportedly Move Head-
quarters to Tehran: London Al-Dustur m Arabic, September 5, 1983, pp. 19-20," in 
JPRS: AR, No. 2856, November 25, 1983, pp. 27-29. 
100. The Armenian Reporter, October 4, 1984, p. 15. 
101. Cited in JPRS: AR, No. 2856. 
52 
